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European integration as a threat to social security: Another 
source of Euroscepticism? 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This study investigates whether citizens’ concerns about the EU’s impact on social 
security are a distinct source of Euroscepticism. By analysing data from the European 
Values Study 2008, we show that citizens differentiate between domain-specific fears 
about European integration (i.e. about social security, national sovereignty, culture, 
payments and jobs), meaning that they cannot be reduced completely to a general fear 
about European integration. Furthermore, socioeconomic determinants and ideological 
position are more important in explaining citizens’ fear about the EU’s impact on social 
security than in explaining their generalised fear of European integration. In countries 
with higher social spending, citizens are more fearful of European integration in general, 
however, social spending does not affect fears about social security more strongly than 
it affects other EU-related fears.  
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Introduction  
 
According to Hooghe and Marks (2008), the ‘permissive consensus’ regarding European 
integration has been replaced by ‘constraining dissensus’ as European institutions and 
policies have become more visible, politicized and contested. Similarly, others argue that 
‘as the nature of the European project is becoming more diverse, so are the reasons to 
oppose it’ (van Elsas and van der Brug, 2015: 197). As a result, concerns about European 
integration and its consequences for member states and citizens have become apparent 
in different areas (Grauel et al., 2013). For example, fear over a loss of political influence 
has a clearly distinct logic and nature compared with concerns that European integration 
threatens national identity and culture (McLaren, 2004). Furthermore, the Eastern 
enlargements and the recent bailout operations have fuelled economic anxieties about 
increasing costs (Bechtel et al., 2014; Karp and Bowler, 2006), while internal market 
policies have fuelled worries about relocating jobs to other countries (Bernaciak, 2014).  
This study focusses on citizens’ concerns about a loss of social security resulting from 
European integration. Whereas economic integration was deemed the driving force for 
rising welfare standards for a long time, concerns that European integration threatens 
welfare and social protection have recently been surfacing (Eichenberg and Dalton, 
2007). Citizens can perceive the interference of the EU in the social policy area either as 
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a threat, leading to a loss of social security, or as an opportunity, reinforcing and 
extending national welfare arrangements. Importantly, fears about a loss of social 
security diminish support for joint European decision-making concerning social policy 
(Mau, 2005) and for European integration in general (Brinegar and Jolly, 2005). 
Nevertheless, the perceived impact of the EU on social security has received little 
previous attention in empirical research (Beaudonnet, 2012; Cautrès, 2012; Ray, 2004). 
In addition, studies focusing on concerns about social security analyse it in isolation from 
citizens’ concerns about the EU’s impact on other domains of society, such as national 
sovereignty, national identity, financial contributions and employment. The differences 
and commonalities between these sources of Euroscepticism have not previously been 
investigated. As a result, knowledge about how strongly the social dimension of 
Euroscepticism is related to other domain-specific concerns about European integration 
is lacking. Accordingly, in this article we investigate if fear concerning a loss of social 
security resulting from European integration can be perceived as a specific fear that is 
peculiar to the social aspects of the EU, or whether it is merely a reflection of a general 
anxiety about European integration sui generis. Second, we examine whether fears that 
European integration endangers the existing social security level are affected differently 
by social-structural position, ideological disposition and national context compared with 
other EU-related fears (referring to national sovereignty, identity, financial contributions 
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and jobs). To answer these questions empirically, we analyse cross-national data from 
the European Values Study (2008) by means of multilevel structural equation modelling. 
Our study illustrates that fear about social security cannot be reduced completely to a 
general fear of European integration, and is related to particular structural and 
ideological determinants. 
 
European integration as a threat: Different sources of Euroscepticism? 
 
Citizens may perceive European integration as a threatening process in its entirety, 
leading to a generalised fear of integration. However, the expansion of the European 
project has made the grounds for opposing European integration more diverse. Various 
sources of Euroscepticism are discussed in the literature, each related to a particular 
threat that the EU poses. These threats centre on the issues of national sovereignty, 
cultural identity, financial contributions, jobs and social security.  
One basis for Euroscepticism relates to the perceived threat to national sovereignty 
(Sørensen, 2007). It originates from opposition towards the very idea of European 
political integration, for example emanating from calls for a political union based on the 
European federal state (Cohn-Bendit and Verhofstadt, 2012). Public support for further 
political integration was already low in the 1990s, and in many policy areas Europeans 
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still prefer national sovereignty to European decision-making (European Commission, 
1997, 2011).  
Euroscepticism may also be rooted in perceptions that European integration challenges 
national identity and culture (Carey, 2002). A substantial proportion of European citizens 
fear that the process of European integration is eroding everyday practices, lifestyles 
and national culture (McLaren, 2004). It has been shown that cultural concerns were an 
important underlying element in the ‘No’ vote in the Dutch referendum of 2005 
(Lubbers, 2008).  
In addition, Euroscepticism can also stem from cost-benefit calculations regarding the 
financial consequences of European integration. In many – especially net-contributing – 
countries, concerns about national financial contributions to the EU budget are 
prevalent (Leconte, 2010). Enlargement of the EU, and the recent Eurozone crisis, 
increased the salience of the financial consequences of European integration, for 
instance in terms of changing incoming subsidies and the budget contributions of 
member states (Hobolt, 2015; Karp and Bowler, 2006).  
A further source of Euroscepticism relates to the threat that the EU poses to the labour 
market and in particular to jobs (Grauel et al., 2013). As a result of the internal market, 
citizens might feel that job prospects and earnings are negatively affected by posted 
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workers (i.e. employees who are sent by their employer to carry out a service in another 
EU Member State on a temporary basis) and the relocation of jobs to member states 
where production is cheaper. In the context of the EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007, 
concerns about regime competition and social dumping were translated into restrictions 
on the free movement of Eastern European workers. 
Turning to the focal point of this study, Euroscepticism can also stem from perceived 
threats to social security (Beaudonnet, 2012). In this regard, Sørensen (2007: 140) 
argues that ‘social Euroscepticism’ – defined as scepticism towards the EU’s social 
engagement – was important to explain differing support for the EU Constitution in 
2005. One in four Europeans who opposed the Constitution mentioned that it was not 
social enough and too liberal (Sørensen, 2007). The view that the EU has a negative 
effect on national social security systems and should promote a Social Europe (Delors 
and Fernandes, 2013) has gained currency in European public opinion. For example, one 
in two citizens worries about a loss of social benefits resulting from European integration 
and 43 percent of Europeans believe that fighting poverty and social exclusion should 
be the top priority for the EU (European Commission, 2007). Social Euroscepticism may 
stem from different facets of the European integration process. First, increased intra-EU 
immigration is assumed to facilitate ‘welfare tourism’ (Fóti, 2015), arousing fears about 
adverse effects on the sustainability of social protection systems. Second, the EU is 
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associated with a ‘race to the bottom’ in social standards, as the internal market 
constrains the ability of governments to sustain generous systems of social protection 
(Kvist, 2004). Third, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and its convergence 
criteria concerning the inflation rate, public finances, interest rates and exchange rate 
stability are seen as significant interference by the EU in the area of domestic 
redistribution (Eichenberg and Dalton, 2007). Following the Euro crisis, the EU – which 
supervises budgetary discipline – has become increasingly associated with cuts in public 
spending and reduced social protection (Leconte, 2010). Lastly, even active social 
policymaking at the European level can produce concerns about the level of social 
protection. Because of the diversity of social protection schemes in Europe, fear of 
convergence towards the ‘lowest common denominator’ that will retrench generous 
welfare states has gained ground (Scharpf, 2010).  
It is clear that fear from European integration can have different substantive roots. Yet 
it is unknown to what extent domain-specific fears, such as concerns about a loss of 
social security, are truly distinct phenomena or are parts of an over-arching generalised 
fear. On the one hand, citizens’ perceptions of the impact of European integration on 
different domains might deviate from one another, because citizens pay more attention 
to issues they find important. On the other hand, one could assume that citizens are 
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relatively uninformed about European integration and fail to differentiate between 
various types of EU-related threats. 
 
Explaining citizens’ fear of European integration concerning social security 
If citizens’ fear of a loss of social security is a truly distinct source of Euroscepticism, this 
should be reflected in the specificity of its causal antecedents. If we can identify 
predictors that are particularly relevant to specific concerns about social security, then 
the assumption that these concerns are merely reflections of a generalised fear of 
European integration can be rejected. A variety of theoretical approaches ─ including 
self-interest, cognitive mobilization, cue-taking and identity approaches (Abts et al., 
2009; Hobolt, 2012) ─ have been put forward to explain EU attitudes.  
Individual-level explanations: Utilitarian interest and ideological orientation 
To explain individual differences in citizens’ fear about a loss of social security, we 
distinguish two complementary approaches: the utilitarian approach and the ideological 
approach, which focuses on preferences regarding government intervention and income 
redistribution. 
The utilitarian approach relates Euroscepticism to self-interest and makes assumptions 
about what social categories are more likely to gain or lose from European integration 
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(e.g. Anderson and Reichert, 1996; Gabel, 1998). It is expected that those with higher 
levels of income, education and occupation skills can benefit more from the new 
opportunities and are better able to succeed in an integrated European market, since 
they are more mobile and flexibly employed. European integration should prove more 
threatening to individuals with lower levels of financial and human capital, because their 
life chances, which were traditionally protected by national boundaries, are being 
reduced (Kriesi et al., 2008). Studies show that citizens with lower socioeconomic status 
and those dependent on the welfare state have more reservations about European 
integration in general (Beaudonnet, 2015; Mau, 2005).  
In line with this reasoning, we can expect that citizens with lower socio-economic status 
are especially concerned about the EU’s impact on social security, because their life 
chances are determined to a larger extent by national welfare provisions than those of 
higher socioeconomic status groups (Gerhards et al., 2016). In particular to welfare 
beneficiaries, European integration may represent a threat to social security as it might 
change the status quo of redistributive mechanisms (Beaudonnet, 2015). For instance, 
the granting of access to social security systems for EU citizens, the induced austerity 
policies and spending cuts of the EMU, and pressures of social policy convergence might 
fuel fear of a loss of social security that is disproportionally stronger among individuals 
with lower socioeconomic status. Although these citizens have also benefited from the 
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EU’s positive market-correcting policies, such as regulations in the field of health and 
safety at work (Falkner, 2010), overall, we could expect that they perceive the EU’s 
impact in the sphere of social protection more negatively. Because citizens’ structural 
position in society influences their dependence on social security, we expect that on top 
of the effect of socioeconomic status on citizens’ generalised fear, socio-economic 
status has an additional negative effect on concerns about the EU’s impact on social 
security. 
Concerns about European integration do not only vary with regard to self-interest 
calculations, but are also rooted in ideological perspectives. Political conflict over 
European integration is related to a left/right dimension concerning state regulation and 
social redistribution (Hooghe and Marks, 1999). Left-wing parties view European 
integration as an amplifier of globalization, inducing rising inequality, and are 
preoccupied with the effects of integration on workers and welfare systems (Bertoncini 
and Koenig, 2014). Accordingly, empirical studies show that voters’ preferences for 
active government in the socioeconomic sphere are an important predictor of 
Euroscepticism (Brinegar & Jolly, 2005; Garry and Tilley, 2015; Van Elsas and Van der 
Brug, 2015). Since European policy has mainly been focusing on the creation of a single 
market, we expect that citizens who are strongly in favour of government intervention 
and income redistribution experience European integration as more threatening. In 
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addition, those who prefer higher levels of government intervention, social regulations 
and redistribution are expected to be particularly fearful of the EU’s impact on social 
protection, because the preservation of social security is salient to them (Føllesdal et al., 
2007). Empirical studies show that left-wing citizens evaluate the EU’s impact on social 
security more negatively than right-wing citizens (Cautrès, 2012; Van Elsas and Van der 
Brug, 2015). Given that left-wing respondents are susceptible to social security related 
concerns, we expect that preferences regarding government responsibility and income 
redistribution are more powerful in explaining citizens’ concerns about the EU’s impact 
on social security in comparison with other types of fear about European integration. 
Explaining cross-national differences 
Various studies have evidenced that contextual factors shape attitudes towards 
European integration (Brinegar and Jolly, 2005; Eichenberg and Dalton, 2007). Most of 
the literature on cross-national variation in attitudes towards the EU is based on 
utilitarian appraisals, assuming that not only individuals, but also entire countries can 
win or lose from European integration. Four explanatory factors are relevant in this 
respect: the level of welfare provisions, national economic conditions, financial transfers 
received from the EU and intra-European immigration.  
European integration affects national welfare states in different ways and to different 
degrees (Scharpf, 2010). In the most-developed welfare states, the free market 
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competition rules exert strong pressures to lower the burden of social security. 
Accordingly, concerns about European integration in the most comprehensive welfare 
states particularly relate to the robustness or vulnerability of their welfare model against 
these pressures (Andersen, 2004). Hereby, a race to the bottom and the deterioration 
of the quality of social services is feared. By contrast, in welfare states where coverage 
is weaker, the expected impact of integration is less negative. Moreover, citizens might 
hope that social standards and social protection levels will improve as a result of the 
EU’s interference in welfare issues (Burgoon, 2009; Mau, 2005). In this regard, empirical 
studies show that in countries with higher levels of social spending, citizens have more 
reservations about the European project (Balestrini et al., 2010; Sanchez-Cuenca, 2000). 
In addition, citizens in more-advanced welfare states evaluate the EU’s impact on social 
security more negatively and are less willing to transfer social competences to the 
European level (Gerhards et al., 2016; Mau, 2005; Ray, 2004). 
Second, citizens’ evaluations of European integration are based on national economic 
conditions (Anderson and Kaltenhaler, 1996). If the national economy is performing 
strongly, citizens tend to believe that supranational politics guarantee or reinforce 
prosperity in the country (Netjes, 2004). Conversely, Euroscepticism has increased most 
strongly in the member states most affected by the recent economic crisis (Foster and 
Frieden, 2017; Serricchio et al., 2013). We expect that economic conditions are 
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especially important for citizens’ confidence about the maintenance of social protection 
levels, as poor economic conditions may trigger fears about cuts in social spending.  
Financial transfers within the EU are another important source of potential country-level 
benefits from European integration and vary considerably across member states. 
Citizens living in countries that benefit more from transfers show greater support for 
European integration overall (Anderson and Reichert, 1996; Brinegar and Jolly, 2005). 
We assume that EU transfers are particularly important in explaining citizens’ 
assessments of how the EU is affecting social welfare. A large proportion of these 
transfers are distributed through the structural and investment funds, reducing regional 
disparities in income, employment, investment and growth (Anderson, 1995), and 
through the agricultural fund of the Common Agricultural Policy. As financial transfers 
are often used for programmes serving welfare functions, we expect that higher national 
benefits reduce negative evaluations regarding the EU’s impact on social protection. 
Lastly, concerns about European integration are often linked to intra-EU immigration 
facilitated by the free movement of individuals (Fóti, 2015). Significant differences in the 
number of EU foreigners exist between countries, with east to west and south to north 
movements being most prevalent (Eurofound, 2014). Although citizens living in 
countries with high intra-EU mobility rates might be more concerned about European 
integration in general (Toshkov and Kortenska, 2015), we expect that intra-EU 
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immigration will increase concerns about the EU’s impact on social protection in the first 
place. Increased migration is believed to put additional pressure on welfare benefits and 
social services in host countries (Kvist, 2004). The assumption of so-called welfare 
tourism, namely that EU migrants are attracted by more generous welfare benefits in 
destination countries, only reinforces this belief. Where the proportion of EU-
immigrants is larger, citizens might thus be more likely to think that European 
integration is detrimental to their welfare state. 
Compared with citizens’ general fear of European integration, we expect that member 
states’ level of welfare provisions, economic conditions, net EU-transfers and intra-EU 
immigration are especially indicative of the perceived EU impact on social security. 
These country characteristics either provide the lens through which citizens will evaluate 
the EU’s impact on social security (i.e. level of national welfare provisions, economic 
conditions) or directly relate to EU-level welfare assistance and its beneficiaries (i.e. EU 
net-transfers, intra-EU immigration). 
Hypotheses 
Table 1 summarizes the hypotheses that are derived from the theoretical arguments set 
out above. We expect that the individual-level and country-level factors mentioned 
influence citizens’ generalised fear of European integration, but also that they have an 
additional influence on citizens’ fear concerning a loss of social security.1 
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[Table 1] 
Data and methods 
Data: We use data from the European Values Study 2008, including all EU-28 
countries.2 Based on probability-based samples of the adult population, face-to-face 
interviews were conducted (computer assisted or pencil and paper), except in Finland 
(internet panel) and in Sweden (postal survey). National response rates range from 
24.38 percent in the United Kingdom to 87.23 percent in Finland.  
Variables  
Individual level: The different types of fears of European integration are measured by 
the following question: ‘Some people may have fears about the building of the 
European Union. For each, tell me if you personally are currently afraid of’: ‘The loss of 
social security’, ‘The loss of national identity and culture’, ‘Our country paying more 
and more to the European Union’, ‘A loss of power in the world for [country]’ and ‘The 
loss of jobs in [country]’. Responses were recorded on a 10-point scale ranging from 
‘Very much afraid’ (1) to ‘Not afraid at all’ (10) and were recoded so that higher scores 
indicate higher levels of fear. The latent variable ‘generalised fear of European 
integration’ underlies all five items. 
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To test the hypotheses of economic self-interest, different indicators of socioeconomic 
status are included. Educational level is measured by the respondents’ highest level of 
education completed (lower-secondary, upper-secondary and tertiary education). 
Income is expressed in quartiles of equivalised household income (including wages, 
salaries, pensions and other incomes) within each country. To equivalise the income, the 
harmonised monthly household income was divided by the number of people living in 
the household, where each additional adult counts for 0.7 and each child for 0.5 units. 
Missing items are included in a separate category (25.09 percent). Employment status is 
included as a variable with five categories: paid employment, retired, student, 
unemployed or disabled, and others (military service, homemaker, etc.). The EVS 
measures the use of welfare benefits by the respondent’s or his/her partner’s 
dependence on means-tested welfare benefits during the last five years prior. These 
benefits do not include entitlements to unemployment or disability benefits, or 
pensions. However, the accurate measurement of employment status is complementary 
in distinguishing specific welfare beneficiaries. 
Ideology is assessed using two items reflecting preferences towards economic 
individualism versus social equality. First, pro-state responsibility attitudes are 
measured by respondents’ self-positioning on a 10-point scale ranging from ‘Individuals 
should take more responsibility for providing for themselves’ to ‘The state should take 
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more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for’. Second, pro-income 
redistribution attitudes are measured by respondents’ self-positioning on a 10-point 
scale ranging from ‘Incomes should be made more equal’ to ‘There should be greater 
incentives for individual effort’. Responses were recoded so that higher scores indicate 
pro-state responsibility and pro-income redistribution attitudes.  
We control for age and gender, migration background (dummy for citizens with at least 
one parent born outside the country of residence) and anti-immigrant attitudes (5-item 
scale) because we expect them to affect citizens’ fear of European integration, although 
they are not the focus of this study. Anti-immigrant attitudes are captured by responses 
on opposite statements (1-10 scale), with  higher scores indicating stronger agreement 
with the statements ‘Immigrants take jobs away from natives in a country’, ‘A country’s 
cultural life is undermined by immigrants’, ‘Immigrants make crime problems worse’, 
‘Immigrants are a strain on a country’s welfare system’ and ‘In the future the proportion 
of immigrants will become a threat to society’. 
Country level: The extensiveness of social welfare provisions is measured by net 
spending on social protection benefits as a percentage of GDP (Eurostat indicator: 
spr_net_ben). Missing data for France and Poland was imputed by figures for the 
nearest available year (2010 instead of 2008). Although more accurate indicators of 
welfare generosity exist (Scruggs et al., 2014), the social spending measure is the best 
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option available for all EU-28 countries. National economic conditions are assessed by 
the annual unemployment rate (Eurostat code: une_rt_a). Financial transfers are 
measured by the member states’ net transfers received from the EU as a percentage of 
their gross national income (see calculations of operating budgetary balances: 
European Commission, 2015). A negative net transfer means that the country receives 
less payment from the EU than it contributes and that the country is thus a net 
contributor, whereas a positive percentage means that the country is a net beneficiary 
of the EU’s budget. Intra-EU immigration is measured by the number of EU immigrants 
per 1000 inhabitants (calculations based on Eurostat data: migr_pop1ctz).  
Descriptive statistics of individual and country-level variables are provided in the 
Online appendix. 
Statistical modelling 
We perform multilevel analyses to take into account the hierarchical data structure and 
to estimate individual-level and country-level effects simultaneously. Between 4.3 
percent (loss of national identity and culture) and 9.8 percent (loss of jobs) of the 
variance of the specific fears is attributable to country-level differences, indicating that 
multilevel analysis is meaningful. Our methodological strategy consists of multiple 
stages. First, to identify to what extent EU-related fears are distinct from one another, 
we conduct multilevel confirmatory factor analysis (MLCFA). This factor-analytic model 
20 
 
makes a distinction between (1) a latent variable that captures the shared variance of 
domain-specific fears, i.e. the generalised fear; and (2) the unique variance of the 
indicators, i.e. the domain-specific fears. Second, to analyse to what extent the 
determinants of fear about a loss of social security are domain-specific, we rely on 
multilevel structural equation models (MLSEM). The advantage of MLSEM over standard 
multilevel regression modelling is that it allows estimating ‘generalised fear’ as a latent 
variable. Figure 1 depicts the general effects by the arrows from the independent 
variables to the latent factor ‘fear of European integration’ at the individual and at the 
country level. The domain-specific effects at both levels are shown by the arrows 
pointing to ‘social security’. These specific effects represent how certain predictors 
affect social fears differently compared to generalised fear. We do not observe 
multicollinearity problems, as all correlations between independent variables range 
between 0.01 and 0.69.  
 
[Figure 1] 
 
Because the number of higher-level units in our dataset (28 countries) is relatively small 
(Meuleman and Billiet, 2009), we make use of Bayesian estimation. The Bayesian 
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approach yields credibility intervals that have better coverage than maximum likelihood 
based confidence intervals (Hox et al., 2012). To obtain estimates of the posterior 
distribution, the Gibbs sampler is used (two chains with maximum of 50,000 iterations). 
To monitor convergence, we used the Gelman-Rubin convergence criterion3 with 0.01 
as the cut-off criterion. Furthermore, we inspected trace plots visually to check the 
convergence of the chains and the stability of the estimates. Because the Bayesian 
approach provides little information about the global model fit, we additionally re-
estimated all models using robust maximum likelihood estimation to obtain fit indices. 
All the analyses were performed using Mplus software version 7.3. 
Results 
Are fears of European integration domain-specific? 
Europeans turn out to be somewhat concerned about the EU’s impact on social security, 
as they score on average 6.14 on a scale from 0 to 10. Overall, these concerns rank third, 
preceded by fears regarding a loss of jobs and increasing national contributions to the 
EU. Details on the domain-specific fears in each country is provided in the Online 
appendix.  
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The (dis)similarities between the five domain-specific fears are investigated using 
MLCFA (see Figure 2). At both levels, the factor structure consists of a single underlying 
latent construct – generalised ‘fear of European integration’ – that is measured by the 
five domain-specific fears. To test the equality of factor structures at the individual level 
and the country level (cross-level isomorphism), we constrained the factor loadings to 
be equal across levels. Modification indices suggested including an error correlation 
between fear over the loss of national identity and culture, and fear about a loss of jobs 
(-0.232; p < 0.001). This negative residual covariance makes sense, because cultural 
threat and the threat to jobs are substantively less associated with each other than the 
other EU-related fears. The adapted model has a good fit: χ2=231.962, the RMSEA equals 
0.020 and both the CFI (0.979) and TLI (0.968) are sufficiently close to 1. The equality of 
factor loadings across levels indicates that the latent construct ‘generalised fear of 
European integration’ is similar at the individual and at the country level. 
The interpretation of parameters in Bayesian CFA is identical to regular CFA models. 
Standardized factor loadings (see Figure 2) are sufficiently strong at the individual level 
(between 0.711 and 0.770) and country level (between 0.719 and 0.946). The strong 
loadings indicate that the domain-specific fears are, to a certain extent, expressions of 
a generalised fear or concern about European integration. At the individual level, 
different fears share between 51 percent (loss of social security) and 59 percent (loss of 
23 
 
national identity and culture) of their variance with the general factor. At the same time, 
this finding implies that almost half of the variance of the domain-specific fears is not 
captured by the underlying factor. On top of the existence of a general component, 
citizens tend to differentiate between the various threats they perceive from European 
integration. 
 
[Figure 2] 
 
At the country level, the standardized factor loadings show a similar pattern but are 
slightly stronger (except for loss of jobs). Fear about a loss of social security loads 0.77 
on the latent factor fear of European integration. About 59 percent of the variance in 
the fear about a loss of social security at the country level is shared with the general 
factor. The country averages for the five fears are more consistent compared with those 
of individuals. This indicates that spillover effects between different sources of 
Euroscepticism are more strongly operating at the country level. If, for example, the fear 
about a loss of social security provoked by European integration is extremely high in a 
certain country, it is likely that negative perceptions in other domains (political, cultural, 
financial and labour market) will also be very high. Nevertheless, Figure 3 illustrates that 
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country means of fear about a loss of social security do not perfectly coincide with the 
other EU-related fears. We see for instance that the Irish and the British perceive lower 
levels of threat to social security than one would expect, given their average level of fear 
about European integration in other domains.4 
 
[Figure 3] 
 
Explaining citizens’ fear about a loss of social security: Domain-specific 
determinants? 
To gain insight into the common and domain-specific determinants of various EU-
related concerns, we turn to MLSEM. Our model estimates individual-level and country-
level effects on the latent variable ‘fear of European integration’ (thus representing the 
commonality of determinants) as well as on the domain-specific fears (i.e. the specific 
effects).5 The model includes a dummy variable for Latvia, which is an influential 
observation6 (see the Online appendix). Table 2 shows the standardized estimates and 
95 percent posterior probability intervals (PPI). PPI’s should be interpreted as the 95 
percent probability that in the population the parameter lies between the two values, 
while standardized parameters can be interpreted in the same way as regular regression 
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coefficients. Fit indices based on robust maximum likelihood estimation indicate a good 
model fit (χ2 = 594.618; df = 75; RMSEA = 0.013; CFI = 0.982; TLI = 0.968; SRMR within = 
0.006; SRMR between = 0.074). 
 
Generalised fear about European integration 
 
With regard to the individual level, several indicators of socioeconomic status have an 
effect on generalised fear over European integration (see Table 2). Those with a tertiary 
education report lower levels of generalised fear than those with lower educational 
credentials. Furthermore, income is negatively related to perceptions of feeling 
threatened by European integration. In comparison with those belonging to the highest 
income quartile, the other income groups report greater levels of fear. We observe 
subtle differences in fear about European integration depending on employment status: 
those who are in paid employment are more concerned about the consequences of 
European integration than pensioners and students are. Experiences of benefit 
dependence in the five years prior to the survey do not affect fear of European 
integration in general. Table 2 shows that citizens’ ideological positions really matter in 
predicting fear of European integration. Those who are more strongly in favour of 
government intervention experience much higher levels of generalised fear about 
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European integration. Additionally, individuals who support income redistribution to a 
larger extent also experience higher levels of threat concerning European integration. 
These findings support hypotheses 1a and 2a. With regard to the control variables, Table 
2 shows that women and citizens with anti-immigrant attitudes also report higher levels 
of generalised fear.  
For the country level, we observe a positive effect of social spending on generalised fear, 
indicating that in member states where net spending on social protection benefits is 
higher, citizens are generally more concerned about the consequences of European 
integration.7 This confirms hypothesis 3a, stressing the relevance of national welfare 
arrangements on citizens’ perceptions concerning European integration. Table 2 shows 
that the unemployment rate, the amount of net transfers received from the EU and the 
intra-EU immigration rate do not affect citizens’ general threat perceptions. These 
findings indicate that national social protection is an important issue in understanding 
cross-national differences in the fear over European integration. Moreover, social 
protection outweighs contextual factors related to economic conditions, European 
transfers and immigration. Hypotheses 4a–6a are thus not supported. 
The model explains 20.4 percent of the individual-level variance and 35.7 percent of the 
country-level variance in the generalised fear of European integration. 
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Fear about a loss of social security resulting from European integration 
 
Table 2 also includes the direct effects on the domain-specific fears of European 
integration. It shows that there are direct effects of some variables on citizens’ fear of a 
loss of social security, in addition to the general pattern outlined above. Whereas high 
incomes are found to temper citizens’ generalised fear of European integration, a 
person’s income has an additional negative effect on the fear about the loss of social 
security. Concretely, those in the lowest two income quartiles are even more fearful 
regarding a loss of social security than one would expect based on their general score 
for fear about European integration. A lower income thus increases concerns about the 
EU’s impact in the cultural, political, financial or economic sphere, but has an even more 
notable impact on the fear of a loss of social security. Similarly, employment status has 
an additional effect on fear about a loss of social security, on top of its effect on 
generalised fear of European integration. Students and pensioners report lower levels 
of generalised fear compared with the employed and these differences are even more 
pronounced regarding the perceived impact of the EU on social security. Those in paid 
employment might be very sensitive about potential changes in the social security 
system to which they contribute. Although the unemployed and disabled are not 
different from those in paid employment in terms of their general level of fear, they are 
more fearful than those in paid employment with regard to social security. The 
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susceptibility to ‘social Euroscepticism’ among the unemployed and disabled can be 
explained by the direct interest in national welfare provision by these groups. 
Furthermore, dependence on means-tested social welfare benefits within the five years 
before the survey increases fear about a loss of social security, whereas benefit 
dependence does not affect the generalised fear level. These findings illustrate that 
indicators of socioeconomic status have a specific impact on fear of a loss of social 
security (hypothesis 1b). While utilitarian interest explains differences in generalised 
fear concerning European integration, this approach is even more important in 
explaining public concerns about the EU’s impact on social security in particular.  
Pro-state responsibility beliefs and support for income redistribution also have 
significant direct effects on social fears. These additional effects are positive, indicating 
that citizens who are in favour of strong welfare states are even more susceptible to 
social security related concerns about European integration than one would expect 
given their generalised fear of European integration. This confirms hypothesis 2b and 
validates previous research stating that a left-wing orientation is positively associated 
with higher levels of fear about a loss of social security (Cautrès, 2012; Van Elsas and 
Van der Brug, 2015). Additionally, we find that the positive impact of anti-immigrant 
attitudes is weaker and that the gender gap is larger with regard to concerns about a 
loss of social security than about citizens’ overall fear of European integration. 
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Contrary to our expectations, we do not find domain-specific country-level explanations. 
While higher social spending increases generalised fears about the impact of European 
integration, it has no additional negative effect on fear concerning a loss of social 
security. Erosion of the social model by external influences is a big concern in advanced 
welfare states, which might cause European integration to be perceived not only as 
detrimental to social protection, but as a threatening process itself. In member states 
receiving more net transfers from the EU, citizens are not less fearful regarding 
European integration, nor are they more likely to evaluate the EU’s impact on social 
protection positively than in member states receiving less. National economic 
conditions, measured by unemployment rates, do not affect citizens’ generalised fear of 
European integration, nor influence citizens’ evaluations of the EU’s impact on social 
security. Lastly, in member states with higher proportions of EU immigrants, citizens are 
not more fearful about the consequences of European integration in any single domain. 
Hypotheses 3b–6b are thus not supported.  
From these findings, we conclude that the uniqueness of different EU-related fears ─ in 
this case, the fear about a loss of social security ─ is reflected by the relevance of 
utilitarian and ideological factors as explanatory mechanisms. Concerns about the EU’s 
impact on social security are generated by specific mechanisms at the individual level, 
namely citizens’ dependence on the welfare state (being unemployed or disabled, and 
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experience of means-tested benefit dependence) and positive attitudes towards the 
welfare state (pro-state responsibility and pro-income redistribution). At the country 
level, different EU-related fears overlap more strongly, which can explain why we do not 
find domain-specific mechanisms for concerns about a loss of social security. 
Euroscepticism at the country level is more a general phenomenon, whereas within 
countries, citizens differentiate between different EU-related fears. Although we also 
find significant additional effects on the other EU-related fears (columns 4–7 in Table 2), 
we do not discuss them, as they are beyond the scope of this article. 
  
[Table 2] 
 
Conclusions  
Three major findings result from this study. First, Europeans are quite concerned about 
a loss of social security provoked by European integration, and this concern is not merely 
an expression of general anxiety about the European Union. Given that citizens are able 
to differentiate between particular fears indicates that they have a more sophisticated 
notion of European integration than is often suggested. Second, utilitarian and 
ideological determinants are of greater importance in explaining concerns about a loss 
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of social security than in explaining generalised fear about European integration. 
Individuals with lower socioeconomic status and who are more in favour of strong 
welfare states are especially susceptible to ‘social Euroscepticism’. These differential 
effects remain hidden when citizens’ fear about a loss of social security is studied in 
isolation from other EU-related fears. Third, spillover effects between specific fears are 
stronger at the country level, which means that countries are characterised by a more 
general climate of fear about integration. This explains why we do not observe domain-
specific contextual determinants of social security concerns. Citizens in member states 
with higher spending on social benefits are more fearful regarding European integration 
in general, although the effect of social spending is not stronger on fears about social 
security. A high level of social protection has the potential to function as a key catalyst 
for Euroscepticism, since the threat that integration poses to social welfare might be 
such a pervasive concern in these countries that it results in stronger reservations about 
European integration as such.  
This study shows that fear regarding European integration is versatile. Research should 
continue to generate in-depth knowledge about which social groups have reservations 
concerning European integration and for what particular reason, in order to untangle 
specific types or sources of Euroscepticism. Citizens’ concerns about specific 
consequences of European integration should ideally not be studied in isolation from 
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other EU-related fears. Researchers should be aware that some of the explanatory 
mechanisms underlying a specific EU-related fear might be explained by citizens’ 
generalised fear of European integration.  
Some limitations and avenues for future research should be mentioned. First, our 
measurement of welfare beneficiaries is very rigorous, as it merely includes 
entitlements to means-tested welfare benefits. Therefore, the observed impact of 
welfare dependency on citizens’ fear for a loss of social security may even be 
underestimated. Further, we did not include citizens’ evaluations about the performance 
of their national welfare states. Citizens who think that their national welfare state is 
performing badly may perceive European integration as less threatening and perhaps as 
an opportunity to increase social protection. In addition, this study provides no insight 
into how concerns about the impact of European integration on social security are 
related to support for (further) European integration. Future research should examine 
how citizens’ perceived impact of European integration on national welfare states 
facilitates or impedes their support for European social policy. So far, we assumed that 
citizens are able to evaluate how European integration potentially affects social security. 
In this regard, it remains unclear to what extent their evaluations are based on framing 
of the EU’s performance by the media and national governments. Their practices of 
blaming the EU or giving credit to it may shape citizens’ perceptions of the EU. Besides, 
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our study does not provide insight into changes in individuals’ fear of European 
integration over time and how recent incisive events at the European level may affect 
public perceptions. In this regard, since 2008, the Eurozone crisis and the recent refugee 
crisis may have stirred up citizens’ threat perceptions. Depending on the degree to 
which countries were affected, these phenomena may have increased cross-national 
differences. For instance, in countries receiving financial assistance, European 
integration has potentially become strongly associated with cuts in social spending 
because of the austerity policies that were conditioned on the bailout packages. These 
issues remain unanswered and call for longitudinal or more recent cross-national data. 
In a broader sense, our results imply that European leaders cannot ignore the social 
agenda. Citizens are aware that European integration is no longer a unilateral story of 
economic affairs. How Europe can reconcile integration with social security has become 
an existential issue, not only for its popular legitimacy but also for its sustainability.  
European integration should proceed with explicit social objectives. Working towards 
upward convergence in social developments, without imposing a ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
model, would be an appropriate response to address concerns about the social 
consequences of integration.  
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Notes
1. While it would be possible to elaborate on the differential impact of these predictors on the other 
domain-specific fears, this exercise is beyond the scope of this paper.  
2. The samples from Great Britain and Northern Ireland were pooled to create one sample for the UK. This 
did not bias our findings. 
3. This criterion determines convergence by considering within-chain and between-chain variability of the 
parameter estimates in terms of the potential scale reduction (Gelman et al., 2014).  
4. Plotted country means of fear about a loss of social security with each of the other EU-related fears 
provide similar patterns; national identity (B = 0.84, p < 0.001), power (B = 0.71, p < 0.001), payments (B 
= 0.81, p < 0.001) and jobs (B = 0.62, p <0.001). 
5. Given that the analyses are conducted on a very large number of observations (N = 38,070), even 
miniscule and insubstantial effects quickly become statistically significant. Therefore, instead of solely 
relying on p-values, it is suggested to pay attention to effect sizes. Aiming for a parsimonious model, small 
unsubstantial direct effects were not allowed in the model.  
6. Whereas higher levels of fear about European integration are found in countries with high social 
expenditure, Latvia does not fit this pattern as it combines low social expenditure with very high levels of 
fear. 
7. We replaced social spending by average growth of GDP over the previous five years, to see whether the 
effect of social spending was due to economic wealth. This proved not to be the case. 
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Figure 1. Hypothesized two-level structural equation model of citizens’ fear of European integration
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Figure 2. MLCFA model of citizens’ fears of European integration - standardized parameters. 
Note: N = 40995; estimator = Bayes; PPP = 0.000; 95% confidence interval = [810.950;885.855]).  
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Figure 3. Scatterplot of country means for fear about European integration (loss of power, loss of national culture 
and identity, increasing payments, and loss of jobs) and mean fear about a loss of social security. 
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Table 1. Hypotheses 
 General effect: fear about EU integration Domain-specific effect: social security 
In
d
iv
id
u
al
 le
ve
l 
 Indicators of socioeconomic status are 
negatively related to generalised fear over 
European integration (H1a). 
 On top of the effect of socioeconomic status 
on generalised fear, indicators of 
socioeconomic status have an additional 
negative effect on fear for a loss of social 
security (H1b). 
 Being in favour of state responsibility for 
welfare and being in favour of income 
redistribution is positively related to 
generalised fear of European integration 
(H2a). 
  On top of the effect of preferences for state 
responsibility and income redistribution on 
generalised fear, these preferences have an 
additional positive effect on fear for a loss of 
social security (H2b). 
C
o
u
n
tr
y 
le
ve
l 
 Where domestic social welfare provisions are 
more extensive, generalised fear about 
European integration is higher (H3a). 
  On top of the effect of welfare provisions on 
generalised fear, extensive welfare provisions 
have an additional positive effect on fear for a 
loss of social security (H3b). 
 Poor national economic conditions trigger 
generalised fear of European integration 
(H4a). 
  On top of the effect of national economic 
conditions on generalised fear, bad economic 
conditions have an additional positive effect 
on fear for a loss of social security (H4b).  
 Net transfers from the EU have a negative 
effect on citizens’ generalised fear of 
European integration (H5a). 
  On top of the effect of net EU-transfers on 
generalised fear, net transfers have an 
additional negative effect on fear for a loss of 
social security (H5b). 
 High intra-European immigration rates have a 
positive effect on citizens’ generalised fear 
about European integration (H6a)  
  On top of the effect of intra-EU immigration 
on generalised fear, intra-EU immigration has 
an additional positive effect on fear for a loss 
of social security (H6b). 
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Table 2. Standardized parameter estimates and posterior probability intervals. 
 Generalised fear Social security Jobs  Culture Payments Power 
 Estimate 95% PPI Estimate  95% PPI Estimate 95% PPI Estimate  95% PPI Estimate  95% PPI Estimate  95% PPI 
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL              
Age  -0.008 [-0.023;0.007]           
Gender (ref = male) 0.061* [0.051;0.071] 0.019* [0.011;0.027]         
Education  
Lower-secondary 
Upper-secondary 
Tertiary (ref) 
 
0.131* 
0.109* 
- 
 
[0.116;0.146] 
[0.095;0.124] 
- 
   
0.030* 
0.026* 
- 
 
[0.019;0.041] 
[0.015;0.036] 
- 
 
-0.038* 
-0.019* 
- 
 
[-0.049;-0.027] 
[-0.029;-0.008] 
- 
    
Income  
1st quartile 
2nd quartile 
3rd quartile 
4th quartile (ref) 
Missing 
 
0.068* 
0.065* 
0.035* 
- 
0.048* 
 
[0.053;0.082] 
[0.051;0.079] 
[0.022;0.049] 
- 
[0.034;0.062] 
 
0.018* 
0.016* 
0.008 
- 
0.010* 
 
[0.006;0.028] 
[0.005;0.026] 
[-0.002;0.018] 
- 
[-0.001;0.020] 
  
 
 
-0.029* 
-0.017* 
-0.019* 
- 
-0.009 
 
[-0.039;-0.017] 
[-0.027;-0.006] 
[-0.029;-0.009] 
- 
[-0.019;0.002] 
    
Employment status 
Paid employment (ref) 
Pensioned 
Student  
Unemployed/disabled  
Others 
 
- 
-0.018* 
-0.031* 
0.003 
-0.008 
 
- 
[-0.033;-0.003] 
[-0.042;-0.020] 
[-0.008;0.014] 
[-0.019;0.003] 
 
- 
-0.028* 
-0.009* 
0.009* 
-0.008 
 
- 
[-0.036;-0.019] 
[-0.017;-0.001] 
[0.001;0.018] 
[-0.016;0.001] 
    
 
    
Dependence on welfare 
benefits over previous 
five years 
0.009 [-0.002;0.019] 0.030* [0.022-0.038]         
Pro-state responsibility 0.092* [0.081;0.102] 0.034* [0.026;0.042]   -0.027* [-0.035;-0.019]     
Pro-income 
redistribution 
0.059* [0.048;0.069] 0.039* [0.030;0.047]     -0.022* [-0.031;-0.014]   
Anti-immigrant attitude 0.379* [0.370;0.390] -0.049* [-0.059;-0.040] 0.019* [0.009;0.028]       
Migration background -0.005 [-0.016;0.007]   0.028* [0.020;0.036] -0.020* [-0.028;-0.011]     
             
COUNTRY LEVEL              
Unemployment rate 0.115 [-0.213;0.428]           
Spending on social 
benefits (% of GDP) 
0.507* [0.083;0.808]           
Transfers received from 
EU (% of GDP) 
0.070 [-0.334;0.474]           
EU immigrants (per 
1000 inhabitants) 
0.064 [-0.269;0.372]           
Dummy Latvia  0.365 [-0.011;0.630]           
             
Residual covariance             
Fearjobs with fearcult -0.233* [-0.249;-0.218]           
             
R² individual level 0.204* [0.196;0.213] 0.517 [0.508;0.525] 0.587 [0.578;0.595] 0.596 [0.587;0.605] 0.554 [0.546;0.563] 0.581 [0.573;0.589] 
R² country level 0.357* [0.121;0.579] 0.715 [0.505;0.869] 0.617 [0.399;0.800] 0.883 [0.716;0.972] 0.763 [0.558;0.896] 0.827 [0.631;0.934] 
*: posterior predictive p < 0.05; PPI = posterior probability interval. N = 38,070. 
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Online appendix 
 
Table A1. Descriptive statistics of individual-level variables.  
 Mean / % S.D. Cronbach’s 
alpha 
N 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES   0.87  
     
Fear loss of social security 6.18 3.03  39927 
Fear loss of power 5.70 3.02  39268 
Fear loss of national identity and culture 5.74 3.07  40259 
Fear payments 6.72 2.81  39182 
Fear loss of jobs 6.82 3.00  40292 
     
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND CONTROLS     
     
Age  48.60 18.04  41799 
Gender 
Man 
Woman  
 
44% 
56% 
  41974 
Educational level  
Lower-secondary 
Upper-secondary 
Tertiary  
 
33.34% 
44.65% 
22.01% 
  41570 
Income  
First quartile 
Second quartile 
Third quartile 
Fourth quartile 
Missing 
 
20.14% 
17.66% 
18.48% 
18.64% 
25.09% 
  41982 
Employment status 
Paid employment 
Retired 
Student 
Unemployed or disabled 
Other  
 
52.32% 
25.79% 
5.79% 
7.46% 
8.64% 
  41690 
Use of benefits 
No 
Yes  
 
86.61% 
13.39% 
  41273 
Pro-state responsibility 4.81 2.61  41141 
Pro-income redistribution 5.80 2.81  40709 
Migration background 
No 
Yes  
 
85.39% 
14.61% 
  41616 
Anti-immigrant attitudes 6.17 2.24 0.87 41461 
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Table A2. Overview of country-level characteristics in 2008. 
Country Survey year N Net social 
spending (% 
GDP) 
Unemploy-
ment rate 
Net 
transfers EU 
(% GNI) 
Intra-EU 
immigration 
(/ 1000 inh.) 
Austria 2008 1510 24.80 4.1 -0.12 34.44 
Belgium 2009 1509 24.37 7.0 -0.20 61.82 
Bulgaria 2008 1500 14.95 5.6 1.92 1.01 
Croatia 2008 1525 17.94 8.6 0.29 1.76 
Cyprus 2008 1000 18.32 3.7 -0.10 103.01 
Czech Republic 2008 1821 17.42 4.4 0.78 12.67 
Denmark 2008 1507 24.59 3.4 -0.22 17.01 
Estonia 2008 1518 14.74 5.5 1.46 6.19 
Finland 2009 1134 22.80 6.4 -0.16 8.90 
France 2008 1501 30.06c 7.4 -0.19 20.15 
Germany 2008-2009 2075 24.88 7.4 -0.34 30.60 
Greece 2008 1500 24.30 7.8 2.68 14.12 
Hungary 2008-2009 1513 22.15 7.8 1.11 10.04 
Ireland 2008 1011 19.97 6.4 0.35 90.44 
Italy 2009 1519 23.64 6.7 -0.25 15.67 
Latvia 2008 1506 12.21 7.7 1.69 2.30 
Lithuania 2008 1500 15.25 5.8 2.67 1.05 
Luxembourg 2008 1610 19.48 4.9 -0.07 365.89 
Malta 2008 1500 17.56 6.0 0.50 19.96 
The Netherlands 2008 1553 21.93 3.7 -0.43 16.03 
Poland 2008 1510 16.94c 7.1 1.25 0.66 
Portugal 2008 1553 22.53 8.8 1.57 10.91 
Romania 2008 1489 14.07 5.6 1.14 0.28 
Slovak Republic 2008 1509 15.53 9.6 1.13 4.80 
Slovenia 2008 1366 20.65 4.4 0.31 2.03 
Spain 2008 1500 20.68 11.3 0.26 46.65 
Sweden 2009-2010 1187 24.99 6.2 -0.40 26.24 
United Kingdom 2009-2010a 
/2008b 
2056 
 
22.46 
 
5.6 -0.04 
 
26.40 
a= Great Britain; b= Northern Ireland; c= figures from 2010; Source: Eurostat. 
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Figure A1. EU-28 and country means for fear about European integration (weighted for gender and age) Source: EVS 
2008, own calculations. 
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Figure A1 shows the country averages for the five domain-specific fears (sorted by the level of 
fear about a loss of social security). In Latvia, Slovenia, Portugal and France, citizens view the EU’s 
impact on social security most negatively (>7). The group of countries where average social fear 
is higher than the EU average is very diverse. There is no notable divide between European 
populations that express more concerns about European integration in general, and countries 
where citizens are more positive overall. Instead, the country ranking diverges to a large extent 
according to the specific issue that is considered. In the UK for example, concerns about shrinking 
national power are the highest out of all the member states, whereas the average fear about a 
loss of social security is close to the EU average. This suggests that the domain-specific fears 
originate, to a certain extent at least, along idiosyncratic lines.  
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Figure A2. Scatterplot of country’s social spending and mean fear of European integration.  
Note: Latvia is not included in the estimation of the trend line 
 
 
